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ZONING LAWS: THE PRIVATE CITIZEN AS AN
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
Frank Eugene Brown, Jr.*
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, as follows:
"That all zoning laws shall henceforth be abolished and neither local
governments nor this state shall exercise any control over growth,
development or land use in any city or other political subdivision in
Virginia."
At first blush this would appear a reactionary, unthinkable con-
cept, an invitation to chaos. A legislator in Virginia who proposed
such a change might well be shuttled home for a "much needed
rest." Yet, this idea does have its outspoken proponents who are well
recognized in the field of land use. One of the more notable is Mr.
Bernard H. Siegan, who has expressed the opinion that urban plan-
ning can often be best served by eliminating zoning laws and per-
mitting the market to totally dictate the course of development in
a particular area. Mr. Siegan holds strongly to the view that zoning
laws permit local politics and favoritism to dictate land use, result-
ing in an irrational distribution of residential, commercial, govern-
mental and recreational facilities, a situation he claims would not
obtain were the machinery of the market left to its own devices.'
Whatever the merits of Mr. Siegan's position, zoning laws are a
fact of life in Virginia and there is no serious movement afoot advo-
cating their total repeal. However, recent years have seen the public
take an increasingly active interest in the administration of local
zoning ordinances, and many would agree with Mr. Siegan's
* Partner, Barham, Radigan, Suiters & Brown, Arlington, Virginia; B.A., 1963, J.D., 1965,
Washington and Lee University.
1. Address by Bernard H. Siegan, Northern Virginia Builders Association Monthly Meet-
ing, March 8, 1973. Mr. Siegan, a Chicago attorney, is a strong proponent of the "no zoning"
concept utilized by several American cities, notably Houston, Texas. This "Adam Smith
approach" to urban planning is based upon the belief that governmental interference with
the machinery of the market necessarily results in a less than perfect product. Mr. Siegan
points out that Houston (the nation's sixth largest city and fourth in volume of construction)
has generally achieved the commonly accepted goals of zoning by allowing normal economic
forces to operate largely unhindered. He believes that homeowners in localities without zoning
have as much, if not more protection through the use of restrictive covenants and economic
controls of the market than would be achieved by zoning.
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premise-that factors other than those relating strictly to land use
concepts often influence land use decisions made by local governing
bodies. Consequently, individuals and citizen groups have become
quite vocal in their demands that zoning laws be strictly enforced,
for fear that politics and favoritism will operate to the detriment of
their neighborhoods. Suppose, however, that a citizen is not satis-
fied with a zoning decision made either by his local governing body
or the officers charged with the administration and enforcement of
the zoning ordinance. What remedies, if any, has he?
This article is intended to be narrow in scope and will not concern
itself with remedies available to an individual who wishes to appeal
a zoning decision relating to his own property,2 and likewise will not
deal with the possibility of utilizing the writ of mandamus in an
effort to compel local officials to enforce the ordinance.3 Rather, it
will explore in some detail the right of a private citizen to file a
lawsuit to enforce a zoning ordinance as it relates to the property of
another. Admininstrative remedies will be discussed only to the
extent that their exhaustion is a condition precedent to access to the
courts.4
The rapid growth and development experienced in recent years,
particularly in urban areas, coupled with the increased awareness
and interest of the public in the administration of zoning laws,
makes this a subject of great importance to the practitioner which,
as yet, has not received the benefit of any definite judicial or legisla-
tive guidelines.
I. SOME BASIC ZONING CONCEPTS
Zoning is nothing more than the power of a political subdivision
to divide the territory under its jurisdiction into districts and regu-
late the use to which land within each district may be put.5 The
2. For decisions involving the use of declaratory judgment to complain of a zoning decision
affecting one's own property, see infra notes 7 & 8.
3. For a case involving the use of mandamus by a property owner, see Ours Properties, Inc.
v. Ley, 198 Va. 848, 96 S.E.2d 754 (1957).
4. For a discussion of the administrative appeal to a board of zoning appeals, see Note,
The Aggrieved Person Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L. REv. 294 (1967).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486 (Repl. Vol. 1973) provides:
Zoning ordinances generally; jurisdiction of counties and municipalities
respectively. The governing body of any county or municipality may, by ordinance,
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purpose of zoning is to promote the health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare of the community, to protect and conserve the value of
buildings and to encourage the most appropriate use of the land.'
Zoning ordinances which do not effectuate these purposes, or are so
vague that they provide no ascertainable standards for their admin-
istration, are-invalid;7 however, the expansive range of zoning objec-
tives and the strong presumption of validity of the ordinance ob-
viously renders an attack on these grounds quite difficult.8
divide the territory under its jurisdiction or any substantial portion thereof into dis-
tricts of such number, shape and area as it may deem best suited to carry out the
purposes of this article, and in each district it may regulate, restrict, permit, prohibit,
and determine the following:
(a) The use of land, buildings, structures and other premises for agricultural, com-
mercial, industrial, residential, flood plane and other specific use;
(b) The size, height, area, bulk, location, erection, construction, reconstruction,
alteration, repair, maintenance, razing, or removal of structures;
(c) The areas and dimensions of land, water, and air space to be occupied by
buildings, structures and uses, and of courts, yards, and other open spaces to be left
unoccupied by uses and structures, including variations in the sizes of lots based on
whether a public or community water supply or sewer system is available and used;
(d) The excavation or mining of soil or other natural resources; and
(e) Sedimentation and soil erosion from nonagricultural lands.
For the purpose of zoning, the governing body of a county shall have jurisdiction over
all the unincorporated territory in the county, and the governing body of a municipal-
ity shall have jurisdiction over the incorporated area of the municipality.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Repl. Vol. 1973); Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488,
178 S.E.2d 508 (1971); Southern Ry. v. City of Richmond, 205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964);
City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641 (1958).
7. Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971) (Board's refusal to
rezone plaintiff's land was arbitrary and capricious); Andrews v. Board of Supervisors, 200
Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445 (1959) (ordinance held invalid because too general and "wholly
vague," providing no uniform standards for the issuance of permits); Board of Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (ordinance held unreasonable, arbitrary, lacking
in uniformity and therefore unconstitutional); Board of Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 316, 106
S.E.2d 152 (1958) (Board improperly used the zoning ordinance to restrict competition;
plaintiff should have been granted rezoning); City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., 172 Va. 209,
1 S.E.2d 296 (1939) (prohibition against installation of floodlights in gasoline filling stations
bore no relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare).
8. Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969) (ordinance held valid
and not an unreasonable, arbitrary exercise of police power); Wilhelm v. Morgan, 208 Va.
398, 157 S.E.2d 920 (1967) (plaintiff failed to overcome the strong presumption of legislative
validity); Southern Ry. v. City of Richmond, 205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964) (ordinance
prohibiting use of railroad's land in the manner desired held valid and constitutional); West
Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937), wherein a bill for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief growing out of city's refusal to rezone
complainant's property, sought to quiet complainant's title to use its land in the manner
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Zoning is a legislative power vested in the state which may be
delegated to cities, counties and towns, and it is within the police
power of the state to pass a statute authorizing the adoption of
zoning ordinances by localities.9 A city has the right under its police
power to pass zoning ordinances if the power to zone is specifically
provided in its charter.'" In the case of counties, which are political
desired and to enjoin the city from interfering. Held, that the ordinance was a valid exercise
of police power and refusal to rezone was warranted.
Note that in order to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance,
the plaintiff has the burden of showing that he will be directly injured. He cannot litigate
the rights of the community at large, and the burden is not discharged by a showing that
someone else may be injured. Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117
(1969); Fairfax County v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9 (1947). But see City of Richmond
v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975); in which the Virginia Supreme Court held that
the presumption of legislative validity attaches not only to a zoning ordinance, but also to
applications for special use permits where legislative bodies are empowered by law to take
such actions. However, when a landowner whose special use permit has been denied shows
that the existing zoning ordinance, as applied to his land, is invalid, and that the use he
requested is reasonable, he has made a prima facie showing that the legislative action denying
his permit was unreasonable. Under these circumstances, the burden then shifts to the legis-
lative body to produce evidence showing that the denial was reasonable. If the evidence of
reasonableness is sufficient to make the question fairly debatable, the legislative denial must
be sustained. In this case it was held that the City's evidence was insufficient to make
reasonableness fairly debatable.
9. City of Richmond v. Southern Ry., 203 Va. 220, 123 S.E.2d 641 (1962); National Mari-
time Union v. City of Norfolk, 202 Va. 672, 119 S.E.2d 307 (1961); Andrews v. Board of
Supervisors, 200 Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445 (1959); Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914
(1926), aff'd, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
10. Language in two Virginia cases seems to go further and imply that a city has power to
zone by virtue of the general police powers contained in its charter. Ours Properties, Inc. v.
Ley, 198 Va. 848, 96 S.E.2d 754 (1957); Wood v. City of Richmond, 148 Va. 400, 138 S.E. 560
(1927). One commentator contends, contrary to the language in Ours Properties and Wood,
that a city has no right to zone merely by virtue of a grant of general police power, and that
unless the charter expressly authorizes the exercise of zoning powers, the city must rely upon
the state enabling acts. 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAw & PRACTICE § 2-6 (3d ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as Yoi]. This contention appears consistent with language in several other Virginia
cases, notably City of Richmond v. Southern Ry., 203 Va. 220, 123 S.E.2d 641 (1962) (the
enactment of zoning regulations is an exercise of the sovereign power of the state which may
be specifically delegated to cities, counties and towns), and City of Richmond v. Board of
Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641 (1958) (municipal corporation may exercise the
following powers and no others: (1) those granted by express words; (2) those necessarily or
fairly implied as incidental to the express powers; and (3) those essential-not simply conven-
ient, but indispensable-to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation).
Yokley's position would seem to be sound for another reason. Exercise of the police power
is limited to the protection of public health, safety, morals and general welfare, whereas
zoning ordinances, in addition to the above, may also protect and conserve the value of
buildings and encourage the most appropriate use of land. See Standard Oil Co. v. City of
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subdivisions of the state, the power to zone stems exclusively from
state statutes, or so-called "enabling acts."'"
It is obvious that the appropriate government officials may en-
force the provisions of local zoning laws, 2 and, in addition to crimi-
nal sanctions, may seek injunctive relief in a court of equity. 3 But
suppose a private citizen believes that the zoning laws are not being
properly administered or enforced in some respect? What rights, if
any, does he have to step in and act as something of a surrogate
zoning administrator? The answer involves a detailed analysis of
several related questions:
1. Since zoning was non-existent at common law, there ob-
viously exist no common law remedies, as such, for private enforce-
ment. But is there any common law cause of action which, in the
absence of statute, may properly be engrafted upon the zoning laws
to permit enforcement by a private citizen?
2. Is there any specific statutory authority permitting private
enforcement of zoning laws? If such statutory authority exists, is it
exclusive and mandatory, or does it merely supplement a common
law remedy which may be applied to zoning laws?
Any inquiry along these lines should logically begin with a general
discussion of the common law method whereby one individual could
restrict the use to which the property of another could be put: the
abatement of a nuisance by injunction.
Charlottesville, 42 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. 1930), holding that police powers in a city charter may
only be used to protect health, safety and morals and may not be utilized to protect property
values, the latter being a proper subject for zoning ordinances only.
In Virginia, this question lies largely in the realm of academia, since the enabling acts have
delegated zoning power to cities, counties and towns, and the only instance in which the issue
may arise would be a situation where the zoning ordinance of a city conflicted in some respect
with the state statutes and the city contended that, because of its independent police powers,
it was not bound to adhere to the enabling acts.
11. Cherrydale Cement Block Co. v. County Bd., 180 Va. 443, 23 S.E.2d 158 (1942); 1
YoKLEY, supra note 10, at § 2-6. Virginia's enabling acts are found in VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 15.1-
427 to -503 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
12. VA. CoDE ANN. § 15.1-491 (Repl. Vol. 1973); McClung v. County of Henrico, 200 Va.
870, 108 S.E.2d 513 (1959); Washington & Old Dominion R.R. v. City of Alexandria, 191 Va.
184, 60 S.E.2d 40 (1950) (dictum); Carroll v. Arlington County, 186 Va. 575, 44 S.E.2d 6
(1947) (dictum).
13. VA. COD ANN. § 15.1-491 (Repl. Vol. 1973); McNair v. Clatterbuck, 212 Va. 532, 186
S.E.2d 45 (1972); Fairfax County v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9 (1947).
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II. COMMON LAW REMEDIES: THE INJUNCTION FOR NUISANCE
Nuisance may be broadly defined as any interference with an-
other person's enjoyment of his property. It embraces everything
that endangers life or health, or obstructs the reasonable and com-
fortable use of property. 4 On a more theoretical plane, it has been
said that nuisance is not conduct or even a condition. Rather, it is
an invasion of a property interest, for which liability may be predi-
cated upon any one of the three traditional common law categories
of liability: intentional conduct, negligence or strict liability.15
There are two types of nuisance-public and private. Private
nuisances afford only a tort remedy, which must be exercised by the
individual whose rights have been disturbed. A public nuisance is
an interference with the rights of the community at large and is a
crime. 6 Actions to abate public nuisances lie with the appropriate
government authorities, and could include criminal prosecution as
well as an action for injunction. 7 However, a public nuisance may
also be a tort, actionable by a private individual, if the plaintiff is
able to prove that he has suffered special and distinct damage,
different both in kind and degree from that suffered by the general
public. Moreover, the damage must be direct, not merely conse-
quential."8 The interference must be substantial and objectionable
to the ordinary, reasonable man, and not merely to a plaintiff with
peculiar sensitivities."
14. Barnes v. Graham Virginia Quarries, Inc., 204 Va. 414, 132 S.E.2d 395 (1963); G.L.
Webster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305 (1939); Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 140
S.E. 656 (1927).
15. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. Rav. 997, 1003-04 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Prosser].
16. Id. at 999.
17. Pope v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 776, 109 S.E. 429 (1921). But see Mears v. Town of
Colonial Beach, 166 Va. 278, 184 S.E. 175 (1936), where it was held that the violation of an
ordinance would not be enjoined at the behest of the town unless it were a nuisance per se
(i.e., an act designated by the ordinance as a nuisance) or unless the violation would result
in special or irreparable injury to property rights.
18. J. H. Miles & Co. v. McLean Contracting Co., 180 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1950); Magee v.
Omansky, 187 Va. 422, 46 S.E.2d 443 (1948); Fugate v. Carter, 151 Va. 108, 144 S.E. 483
(1928); Payne v. Goodwin, 147 Va. 1019, 133 S.E. 481 (1926); Miller v. Truehart, 31 Va. (4
Leigh) 569 (1833); Beveridge v. Lacey, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 63 (1824).
19. Prosser, supra note 15, at 1002. By way of illustration of the foregoing principles, cases
have held that a plaintiff cannot be heard to complain: Drummond v. Rowe, 155 Va. 725,
156 S.E. 442 (1931) (of an unlicensed professional activity); Baird v. Board of Recreation
[Vol. 9:483
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If an action at law for damages2" is inadequate relief, a plaintiff
may seek the aid of equity and ask that a private nuisance be en-
joined.' If a plaintiff suffers special damages from a public nuis-
ance, and thus has standing to sue, he may also seek to have such
a nuisance enjoined. 2
Since zoning laws are creatures of statute, unknown at common
law, there exists no common law principle that such statutes may
be enforced by a private individual or government authorities
through the equitable remedy of injunction. If the use of one's prop-
erty in violation of a zoning ordinance constitutes a private nuis-
ance, a plaintiff whose property is affected thereby may seek an
injunction without reference to any zoning violation. The concern
here, however, is with the right of a Virginia plaintiff to enjoin the
use of another's property, not because such use constitutes a nuis-
ance, but based solely upon the fact that such use is in violation of
the zoning laws.2 3 Accordingly, the state enabling acts must be ex-
amined to ascertain if any remedies for enforcement are contained
therein and, if so, whether they are exclusive or exist concurrently
with the common law right to seek injunctions in a given case. As
will be shown, the nuisance principles set out above have, directly
or indirectly, influenced the decisions of certain courts in this area.
HI. STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ZONING
LAWS
In addition to Virginia Code Section 15.1-491, which gives govern-
ment authorities the right to enforce the ordinance, either by a
criminal prosecution or by an action for injunction, 4 two other pro-
Comm'rs, 110 N.J. Eq. 603, 160 A. 537 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932) (of a noisy baseball game);
Daniel v. Kosh, 173 Va. 352, 4 S.E.2d 381 (1939) (of operation of a gasoline filling station)
when he has suffered no harm separate and distinct from that suffered by the community at
large.
20. In Barnes v. Graham Virginia Quarries, Inc., 204 Va. 414, 132 S.E.2d 395 (1963) and
G. L. Webster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305 (1939), the court affirmed judg-
ments when damages were shown with reasonable certainty.
21. Fugate v. Carter, 151 Va. 108, 144 S.E. 483 (1928); Switzer v. McCulloch, 76 Va. 777
(1882).
22. J.H. Miles & Co. v. McLean Contracting Co., 180 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1950); Fugate v.
Carter, 151 Va. 108, 144 S.E. 483 (1928); Long's Baggage Transfer Co. v. Burford, 144 Va.
339, 132 S.E. 355 (1926); Miller v. Truehart, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 569 (1833).
23. It will be assumed that, but for the zoning ordinance, the use would be lawful.
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491 (Repl. Vol. 1973). Cases involving governmental enforcement
1975]
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visions of the enabling acts are relevant to this inquiry: sections
15.1-49625 and 15.1-499.2s The latter speaks generally of the right to
enjoin any violation or attempted violation of the provisions of the
enabling acts, or any regulation adopted thereunder, without speci-
fying in whom such rights exists, and the relevant portion of section
15.1-496 provides that:
Where a building permit has been issued and the construction of
the building for which such permit was issued is subsequently sought
to be prevented, restrained, corrected or abated as a violation of the
zoning ordinance, by suit filed within fifteen days after the start of
construction by a person who had no actual notice of the issuance of
the permit, the court may hear and determine the issues raised in the
litigation even though no appeal was taken from the decision of the
administrative officer to the board of zoning appeals.Y
This section places several conditions upon the right to proceed
under its provisions, including what appears to be a fifteen day
statute of limitations and lack of actual knowledge of issuance of the
permit. Although the statute does not specify the form of action
permitted, the language is clearly that of injunctive relief.28
The Virginia Supreme Court has not interpreted section 15.1-496
or any of its predecessor statutes,2 9 nor do any revisor's notes or
committee reports exist which would shed light on the legislative
intent." In addition, none of the highest courts of the other forty-
of zoning ordinances are collected at notes 12 & 13 supra.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-496 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
26. Id. § 15.1-499 provides:
Any violation or attempted violation of this chapter, or of any regulation adopted
hereunder may be restrained, corrected, or abated as the case may be by injunction or
other appropriate proceeding.
27. Id. § 15.1-496. The quotation in the text is the last portion of this rather lengthy statute.
The portions of the statute which preceded the quoted portion concern the procedures which
property owners must follow to obtain special exceptions to a zoning ordinance or to appeal
from decisions of the zoning administrator granting or denying such special exceptions.
28. Note that the statute speaks of the building construction being "prevented, restrained,
corrected or abated."
29. The predecessor statutes to § 15.1-496 are collected and discussed in text accompanying
notes 40-54 infra.
30. The author contacted the Clerk of the House of Delegates and Mr. John A. Banks, Jr.,
Director of Legislative Services, in an effort to locate any revisor's notes or committee reports
[Vol. 9:483
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nine states have rendered a decision on a similar statute. Therefore,
the evolution of section 15.1-496 becomes of prime importance in
attempting to ascertain the effect intended by the General Assem-
bly. The basic questions which must be answered are these:
(1) Is the statute constitutional?
(2) Does section 15.1-496 provide an exclusive and mandatory
remedy for private enforcement of the zoning ordinances, under the
conditions set out therein, or does section 15.1-499 engraft upon the
zoning laws the common law remedy of injunction, with laches as
the only time limitation on the right to bring an action?
(3) In what cases, if any, must administrative remedies be ex-
hausted before resort may be had to the courts?
(4) What standing is necessary under section 15.1-496?
(5) Is section 15.1-496 applicable only to situations where a spe-
cific decision of the zoning administrator is being questioned?
(6) What effect, if any, do "staged" building permits have on
the operation of the statute?3
(7) What occurs if a person acquires actual knowledge of the
issuance of a building permit prior to the start of construction, but
after the time for appeal of the decision to issue the permit has
expired?32 Along these same lines, what rights accrue to a private
individual who discovers, more than fifteen days after the start of
construction, that a building is being constructed in violation of the
building permit?
(8) What vested rights, if any, does the builder have in a build-
ing permit?
(9) Since the Virginia Supreme Court has held that a building
relative to § 15.1-496 or any of its predecessor statutes. Both individuals made a search of
their files from the inception of the enabling acts to present, and reported that neither
revisor's notes nor committee reports exist.
31. This term is meant to refer to the situation where several building permits covering
different phases of construction are issued at different times (e.g., excavation permit, footing
permit, shell permit, mechanical permit). This is common in commercial construction where
it is often impractical to complete all of the complex plans required by the locality or munici-
pality prior to commencing construction.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-496 (Repl. Vol. 1973), requires that the decision of the zoning
administrator be appealed within thirty days after such decision is rendered.
19751 491
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permit issued in violation of a zoning ordinance by an official lack-
ing power to alter or vary the ordinance is void,3 how can any
limitation be placed upon the right to challenge construction of the
offending structure?
Before it becomes necessary to consider the effect of the statute,
it must first be determined whether section 15.1-496 is constitu-
tional.
A. Constitutionality of Section 15.1-496
The constitutionality of zoning enabling acts and ordinances in
general is well established.34 However, the Constitution of Virginia
provides that, "[n]o law shall embrace more than one object,
which shall be expressed in its title. ' 35 The title to section 15.1-496
("Applications for special exceptions; appeals to board; proceedings
to prevent construction of building in violation of zoning ordi-
nance") well delineates the contents of the statute; but does the
"law. . .embrace more than one object. .. ."?
Statutes are, of course, presumed valid until their violation of the
constitution is proven beyond all reasonable doubt, and the quoted
constitutional provision has been liberally construed so as to uphold
acts of the General Assembly. Though the constitutionality is not
free from doubt, taken in the context of the extremely liberal con-
struction of article IV, section 12 of the Virginia constitution, the
section would probably survive constitutional attack, since the gen-
eral object of the statute seems to be the establishment of proce-
dures for challenging decisions affecting the administration of zon-
ing ordinances. As we shall see, however, section 15.1-49611 evolved
from several statutes which were originally separate code sections,
and the amalgamation causes severe problems in interpretation.
33. Segaloff v. City of Newport News, 209 Va. 259, 163 S.E.2d 135 (1968).
34. See Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914 (1926), afl'd, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
35. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
36. Parker v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 281, 208 S.E.2d 757 (1974); City of Richmond v.
Pace, 127 Va. 274, 103 S.E. 647 (1920).
37. Unless otherwise noted, references to § 15.1-496 will be understood to refer to that
portion of the statute giving any person without actual notice of the issuance of a building
permit the right to file an action claiming violation of the zoning ordinance within fifteen days
after the start of construction of the building in question. See text accompanying note 27
supra. The other paragraphs of the statute will be discussed as they become relevant.
[Vol. 9:483
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B. Section 15.1-496-An Exclusive and Mandatory Remedy
It would seem only logical that the Virginia Legislature meant for
the statute to be an exclusive and mandatory remedy, particularly
since there purports to be a fifteen day limitation upon the right to
file suit. It must be presumed that in enacting zoning regulations,
which impose restrictions on the free use of property and are thus
in derogation of the common law,3" the General Assembly acted with
full knowledge of the strict construction given to such statutes.39 As
such, it is unlikely that the General Assembly intended for an indi-
vidual to be able to rely upon the general common law injunctive
powers of a court of equity, or claim that such general powers had
been codified in section 15.1-499, should he be barred by the fifteen
day limitation. Were such the case, the fifteen day provision would
be pure surplusage, a futile act on the part of the legislature.
This conclusion finds further support in the legislative history of
section 15.1-496 and, since this is the only direct clue to the intent
of the legislature, the derivation of the statute as it relates to access
to the courts must be briefly discussed.
Although the first zoning enabling acts in Virginia were enacted
in 1922, 40 the statute which forms the basis of our present enabling
acts was enacted in 1926.4  While this statute applied only to cities
and towns, 42 the legislature in 1927 established similar procedures
for counties, but only for those counties with specific population
38. Wheelwright v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 512, 49 S.E. 647 (1905). See also Peterson v.
Zoning Bd. 412 Pa. 582, 195 A.2d 523 (1963).
39. Hannabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519, 180 S.E. 416 (1935).
40. Va. Acts of Assembly 1922, ch. 43, at 46. The Act appeared as section 3032(a) of the
Virginia Code of 1924, and authorized cities (not counties or towns) to regulate land use
through zoning. No procedures of any type were established; the Act merely conferred upon
cities the power to zone.
41. Va. Acts of Assembly 1926, ch. 197, at 345. This Act authorized cities and towns to zone
and contained provisions, much like the present act, for appeal by a "person aggrieved" of a
decision of the zoning administrator to the board of zoning appeals "within a reasonable
time." Id. § 10, at 347. A further appeal of the board's decision to the appropriate court of
record was authorized, provided that the appeal was taken within thirty days after filing of
the decision by the board. Id. § 16, at 348.
42. The local authorities were given power, "in addition to other remedies," to institute
proper action to prevent, abate, restrain or correct a violation of the local ordinance relating
to the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, occupancy or use of any
building or structure. Id. § 22, at 349.
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figures. 3 In 1938, the General Assembly passed a separate enabling
act for all counties which did not qualify under the population re-
quirements of the 1927 Act. The 1938 Act, however, established
procedures for the presentation of complaints of "persons ag-
grieved" which differed from those applicable under the 1926 and
1927 Acts. 4
These two separate sections relating to counties, and the provi-
sions relating to cities and towns, appeared in the Virginia Code of
1942. That Code merely continued in effect the earlier statutory
provisions. Under these statutes, the provisions for appeal of a "per-
son aggrieved" of a decision of the board of zoning appeals depended
upon the population of the place of residence of the individual. For
residents of cities or towns,4" and for residents of counties with speci-
fied population figures, 4 the procedures were similar. Appeals from
decisions of zoning administrators were taken to the board of zoning
appeals.47 Any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of zoning
appeals could, within thirty days after the filing of such decision,
appeal to the appropriate court of record." Under these provisions,
a private citizen had no right of appeal to the courts unless adminis-
trative remedies were first exhausted (appeal to the board of zoning
appeals). Under Chapter 115C,49 relating to counties in general, re-
43. Va. Acts of Assembly 1927, ch. 15, at 26. The Act applied only to counties with a density
of population of more than five hundred persons per square mile. Appeals to the board of
zoning appeals could be taken within fifteen days after entry of the decision appealed from
(Section 12), and the provisions relating to appeal of the board's decision to a court of record
were the same as those found in Va. Acts of Assembly 1927, ch. 15, section 15, at 347. Section
16 established procedures for enforcement by local authorities identical to those applying to
cities.
44. Va. Acts of Assembly 1938, ch. 415, at 777. Section 7 provided that the board of
supervisors, if it so desired, could establish a county board of zoning appeals. Any person or
persons aggrieved by any decision of the board, or any taxpayer or county official could
present a petition setting forth the grounds of the grievance to the next regular meeting of
the board of supervisors. Section 8 gave the county officials the same powers of enforcement
as given to cities and counties with specified populations.
45. VA. CODE ANN. 0 3091(1)-(26) (1942).
46. Id. § 2880K-2880(11) (1942).
47. Note that residents of counties with specific population figures were required to bring
an appeal within fifteen days after entry of the decision appealed from (see note 43 supra),
while residents of cities or towns were required to appeal to the board "within a reasonable
time" (see note 41 supra).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 2880bb (1942) (counties with specified populations); id. § 3091(16)
(1942) (cities).
49. Id. § 2880mm - 2880ww (1942).
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dress from decisions of the board of zoning appeals was limited to
an appeal to the next regular meeting of board of supervisors or
other governing body of the county; 0 no access was allowed to the
courts at all.
In 1948, section 2880v of chapter 115B, pertaining to counties with
specified population figures, was amended to provide recourse to the
courts in cases where a building permit had been issued and one
with no actual notice of the issuance of the permit desired to pre-
vent, restrain, correct or abate the construction of a building as a
violation of the zoning law." The amendment was very similar to
the present language of section 15.1-496, but provided that suit
must be filed within thirty days after the start of construction. The
other provisions of the 1942 Code previously discussed remained
unchanged.
The Code revision of 1950 continued the tripartite organization of
the enabling acts.2 The pertinent substantive content of these Acts
remained unchanged with one exception. Residents of counties in
general, for the first time, were granted the right to appeal to the
appropriate circuit court within thirty days -after the filing of the
decision of the board of zoning appeals.13 With this change all Vir-
ginia residents enjoyed the right to judicial review of the board's
decision. It is worthy of note that the article pertaining to counties
with specific populations preserved the provisions of the 1948
50. Id. § 2880ss (1942).
51. Id. § 2880v (Cum. Supp. 1948). The statute read in part:
Provided that in any case where a building permit is issued by the administrative
officer, and the construction of the building for which such permit was issued is subse-
quently sought to be prevented, restrained, corrected or abated as a violation of a
zoning law by suit filed within thirty days after the start of construction by a person
who had no actual notice of the issuance of the permit, the court may hear and
determine the issues raised in the litigation even though no appeal was taken from the
decision of the administrative officer to the Board of Zoning Appeals.
52. Id. §§ 15-819 to -843 (1950) (applying to cities and towns); id. §§ 15-844 to -854 (1950)
(applying to counties in general); id. §§ 15-855 to -885 (1950) (applying to counties with
specific population figures). Actually, the zoning enabling acts of 1950 included a fourth
section (§§ 15-886 to -890) which contained special provisions for counties adjoining cities
with a population of 180,000 or more. None of these provisions are relevant to this discussion.
53. Id. § 15-850 (1950). Section 15-850.1 allowed persons residing in counties with a density
of population in excess of two thousand per square mile to petition the board of supervisors
to review a decision of the board of zoning appeals prior to appealing to the circuit court.
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amendment to section 2880v of chapter 115B, including its require-
ment that suits be filed within thirty days after the start of con-
struction. These provisions were found in section 15-867.1 of the
1950 Code.
In 1962, the numerous statutes cited above were compressed into
sections 15-968.10 and 15-968.11 of the Virginia Code." Distinctions
between cities and towns, counties generally and counties with cer-
tain specific populations were abolished. All of the remedies pre-
viously cited were set out in sections 15-968.10 and 15-968.11 rather
than being the subject of separate sections as before. Section
15.968.10 included the prior sections 2880v and 15-867.1, and pro-
vided that a person with no actual notice of the issuance of a build-
ing permit could file a suit to prevent the construction of a building
as a violation of the zoning ordinance, but significantly shortened
the time for filing such suit from the previous thirty day limitation
to a fifteen day limitation. These two sections ultimately became
sections 15.1-496 and 15.1-497, which are in effect today.
In view of the history of section 15.1-496, which provides the only
source of legislative intent, it seems clear that the statute provides
an exclusive remedy and is mandatory, and those seeking to file an
action which comes within its purview are bound by the fifteen day
limitation. The statute has been revised many times over the years,
indicating a great deal of thought on the part of legislators. It was
not until 1950 that all areas of the state were given the right to
appeal a decision of the board of zoning appeals to the appropriate
court of record. More significantly, until 1962, direct access to the
courts for enforcement of the zoning laws relating to construction of
a building, which action first became possible in 1948, was restricted
to those individuals residing in counties with specific population
figures. In 1962, when the remedy became generally available, the
time for filing suit was shortened to the present fifteen day limita-
tion.
The provisions of the enabling acts which granted access to the
courts to private individuals (until 1948, only as an appeal from the
board of zoning appeals) were originally, and for some time there-
after, set out in three separate sections of the Code, with rights
54. Id. §§ 15-968.10 & 15-968.11 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
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depending upon an individual's place of residence. The conclusion
seems inescapable that the legislature believed that access to the
courts by private individuals to contest zoning laws was nonexistent
absent a specific statutory grant of such a right. Such grants care-
fully prescribed and limited the conditions for the filing of suit by
a private individual. It is submitted that such rights of access were
intended to be, and are, exclusive and jurisdictional. One noted
writer in the field of zoning has stated: "It is to be borne in mind
that-of course-where a specified form or manner of procedure is
established by state or charter or ordinance provisions, such respec-
tive method must be pursued."55
IV. LmTATIONS OF SECTION 15.1-496
It is evident from the language of section 15.1-496 that some rights
are conferred upon private citizens to file an action to prevent,
restrain, correct or abate the construction of a building, which con-
struction is allegedly in violation of a zoning ordinance. Beyond this,
the import and effect of the statute are far from clear.
In the brief paragraph which grants direct access to the courts to
enjoin construction of a building allegedly in violation of the zoning
laws (hereinafter referred to as the "direct access provision"), sec-
tion 15.1-496 raises far more questions than it answers, and this
writer does not pretend to possess the prescience necessary to defini-
tively delineate the parameters of the statute. However, certain
basic conclusions may be drawn with regard to the extent of the
rights conferred upon an individual proceeding under this section.
A. Objections to the Use of a Building
On its face, the rights provided by the direct access provision of
section 15.1-496 are limited to those situations where the construc-
tion of the building is sought to be prevented, restrained, corrected
or abated as a violation of a zoning ordinance. The statute is silent
with regard to the right to complain about the use contemplated for
the building. It could be argued that the act encompasses use, on
the theory that if the use permit has been illegally issued, and is
therefore void,5" the building permit issued thereunder is also void,
55. MarzENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONMNG 147 (2d ed. 1955) (emphasis in original).
56. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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and consequently the building is being constructed in violation of
the zoning ordinance (i.e., without either a valid use or building
permit). However, this involves a rather tortured interpretation of
the statute, and it is believed that section 15.1-496 contemplates
only complaints regarding the actual physical construction of a
building. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the public
has at least constructive notice of the issuance of all use permits
because of the requirement of a public hearing after published no-
tice. However, once a use permit is in existence, the issuance of a
building permit is a mere ministerial act if the plans supplied con-
form to the building code.5" Hence, there is no requirement for any
notice to be given as building permits are issued. Objections to the
issuance of a use permit, then, can be properly aired before the
governing body, while the same opportunity does not exist with
regard to the building permit.
B. Decision of the Zoning Administrator
Since the majority of section 15.1-496 is concerned with decisions
of the zoning administrator and appeal of those decisions, is direct
access to the courts limited to the challenge of a particular decision
of the zoning administrator, such as an interpretative ruling regard-
ing construction? An examination of the direct access provision of
section 15-867.1 of the 1950 Code reveals that the predecessor stat-
ute of section 15.1-496 began as follows: "In any case where a build-
ing permit is issued by the administrative officer, and construction
of the building for which such permit was issued is subsequently
sought to be prevented, restrained, corrected or abated as a viola-
tion of a zoning law. . ... ,1 Hence, it is logical to assume that
section 15.1-496 is concerned with the challenge of decisions of the
zoning administrator, but that the decision contemplated is the
decision to issue the building permit itself, without reference to, or
requirement to specifically challenge, any specific determination
which may have influenced that decision. 9
57. State ex rel. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Hendrickson, 393 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1965);
Vagoni v. Brady, 420 Pa. 411, 218 A.2d 235 (1966); Herskovits v. Irwin, 99 Pa. 155, 149 A.
195 (1930).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-867.1 (1950) (emphasis added).
59. Actually, in most cases numerous governmental departments must concur that the
structure is in conformance with the zoning ordinance and the use permit, but the overall
responsibility and final determination rests with the zoning administrator.
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C. Actual Notice of the Issuance of the Building Permit: When
Acquired
In order to avail himself of the direct access provision of section
15.1-496, a complainant must show that he had no "actual notice
of the issuance of the [building] permit." However, at the time suit
is filed, the party will undoubtedly have actual notice of the exist-
ence of the building permit (and hence actual notice of its issuance
at some prior time), if for no other reason than construction will
have begun and notice of the permit will have been tacked to a tree
or otherwise prominently displayed at the construction site. Since
the statute speaks of actual notice of the issuance, rather than the
existence of the permit, it undoubtedly refers to actual notice at the
time of issuance. Otherwise, it would be possible to have a situation
in which a person receives actual notice of the existence of the
permit prior to construction. commencing but after the thirty day
period for appeal of the zoning administrator's decision had expired,
leaving the individual without any remedy: he cannot appeal to the
board of zoning appeals, and cannot file suit under the direct access
provision because of his actual notice. It is not believed that such
an interpretation was contemplated by the General Assembly.
There are numerous situations between the two extremes which
could be posited. For example, an individual may obtain actual
notice of the existence of the building permit a day or two after it
is actually issued. In this circumstance, he would have his choice of
two remedies: he could appeal to the board of zoning appeals, and
then to the appropriate court of record should the decision of the
board be adverse, or he could utilize the direct access provision.
This contention is fortified by the fact that section 15.1-496 author-
izes direct access to the court by one with no actual notice of the
issuance of the building permit "even though no appeal was taken
from the decision of the administrative officer to the board of zoning
appeals." The quoted portion of the statute would have no meaning
unless it contemplated a situation where a person would have the
option to appeal to the board (knowledge of the issuance of the
permit having been obtained prior to the expiration of the thirty day
appeal period), but would not be required to do so (knowledge not
having been obtained at the time the permit was issued).
In most cases, the practitioner would be well advised to pursue
the administrative remedies in such a situation. Although it may be
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argued that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required
under the facts of the case, the pursuit of such remedies precludes
any defense arguments along these lines and it is submitted that
some judges feel, consciously or subconsciously, that one who has
exhausted his administrative remedies comes into court with partic-
ularly clean hands. In addition, it would appear that the complain-
ant has everything to gain and nothing to lose by pursuing the
administrative remedies first. If he comes into court under the di-
rect access provision, he is saddled from the beginning with the
presumption that the decision of the zoning administrator is valid. 0
If he appeals the administrator's decision to the board of zoning
appeals and loses, his position would be approximately the same on
appeal to a court of record. However, should he prevail before the
board of zoning appeals, his opponent would, on appeal to the cir-
cuit court, be forced to overcome the weight and presumption of
validity which would attach to the decision of the board. As always,
the final decision in such matters must rest with the good judgment
of the particular practitioner, as he is familiar with the local courts
and boards and is thus in the best position to evaluate his chances
of success and the risks involved in each possible course of action.
D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
It appears that if a person has actual notice of the issuance of a
building permit, as previously defined, he must exhaust his admin-
istrative remedies by an appeal to the board of zoning appeals, as
the direct access provision is available only to one without such
notice. There is a compelling reason for forcing one with actual
notice of the issuance of the permit to appeal first to the board, as
one with such notice is able to examine the plans for the building
and determine whether, in his opinion, the proposed construction is
in conformance with the zoning ordinance. The statute thus places
upon him the duty to make inquiry and air his grievances at the
earliest possible time. Similarly, one without actual notice of the
issuance of the permit has the same duty of inquiry and action when
construction actually begins.
60. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 9:483
ZONING LAWS
E. Staged Permits
Quite often, permits for the construction of a complex commercial
building are issued at different times for different phases of con-
struction. For example, a permit allowing the erection of the shell
of the building may be issued two months after the permit allowing
excavation. It may well be that a person would have no objection
to the excavation, but would contend that the shell violated the
zoning ordinance in some respect (e.g., exceeded the height limita-
tion). Consequently, he would not have notice of the condition
which he claims violates the ordinance within thirty days of the
issuance of the original permit. In this circumstance, it is believed
that the thirty day period for appeals to the board begins running
from the issuance of each permit with regard to matters covered by
the particular permit. The same cannot be said of the fifteen day
limitation contained in the direct access provision as, on the face of
the statute, it is keyed only to the start of construction and makes
no mention of particular phases of construction. Again, this would
be a logical result, as it is not unfair to require that once construc-
tion begins, an individual has the duty to make inquiry with regard
to the different phases if he has some notion of privately enforcing
the zoning ordinance. If such inquiry is diligently made, he then
would have actual notice of the issuance of subsequent building
permits at the time of issuance, and could appeal to the board of
zoning appeals and then to the appropriate court of record.
Suppose that more than fifteen days after construction has begun,
an individual discovers that the building is being constructed in
violation of the plans upon which the building permit was issued.
In this instance, he simply has no remedy under any relevant zoning
statutes and must rely upon local officials to enforce the ordinance.
Should the practitioner be faced with this situation, he should in-
vestigate the availability of the writ of mandamus should the offi-
cials refuse to act.
F. Standing to Bring Suit
Standing to file suit under the direct access provision of section
15.1-496 appears to be quite flexible-the only apparent require-
ment is that the person have no actual notice of the issuance of a
building permit. On the face of the statute, there is not even a
requirement that the person be a resident of the locality in which
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the building is being constructed. Compare this with the mandate
that in order to appeal a decision of the zoning administrator to the
board of zoning appeals, the complainant must be a "person ag-
grieved,""1 indicating a general requirement that there be some ad-
verse effect on his property rights stemming from the decision ap-
pealed. 12 Surprisingly, standing is relaxed under section 15.1-497 for
an appeal from the decision of the board of zoning appeals to a court
of record, and "any taxpayer," as well as a "person aggrieved," may
perfect such appeal. 3 Although the term "any taxpayer" indicates
that the individual must be a property owner, it does not require
that his property be affected by the decision. The result is the anom-
alous situation of a person being able to appeal a decision of the
board of zoning appeals who had no standing to bring the matter
before the board in the first place. A literal reading, therefore, of the
standing requirements of the direct access provision and that au-
thorizing an appeal of a decision of the board of zoning appeals
raises serious questions as to the validity of these sections of the
enabling acts.
It has been demonstrated that zoning is a legislative power resid-
ing in the state and that the enactment and enforcement of zoning
regulations is an exercise of the sovereign power of the state.14 Al-
though this enforcement power may be delegated to cities, counties
and towns, reported decisions say nothing of delegation of enforce-
ment powers to private citizens. In fact, the cases specifically hold
that it belongs to the legislative department to exert police powers
and that delegation of such powers is permitted only to municipali-
ties and other governmental subdivisions of the state.65
Unquestionably, the General Assembly could not, under the Vir-
ginia Constitution, delegate the decision-making aspect of its legis-
61. VA. CODE ArNN. § 15.1-496 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
62. See Note, The Aggrieved Person Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 294
(1967). One is immediately reminded of the "special and distinct harm" language in the cases
which define the standing of a private citizen to sue for public nuisance. See text accompany-
ing notes 14-22 infra and following note 68 supra.
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-497 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The petition must be filed with the appro-
priate court of record within thirty days after the filing of the decision in the office of the
board.
64. See note 9 supra.
65. Id. Webster Sanitation Comm'n v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 87 S.E.2d 153 (1955); Town of
Farmville v. Walker, 101 Va. 323, 43 S.E. 558 (1903).
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lative powers to a private citizen.66 It is believed that the same holds
true for wholesale delegation of the right to enforce regulations en-
acted pursuant to the police power. Consequently, a purported dele-
gation of the right to file suit to enforce a zoning regulation (or
appeal a decision of the board of zoning appeals) to one who will
derive no direct benefit from a favorable decision nor suffer any
special detriment from an adverse ruling (i.e., one who is not a
"person aggrieved") is void. This conclusion is consonant with the
decisions holding that in order to have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance, the plaintiff has the burden
of showing that he, and not some other person or the public at large,
will be injured.17
In light of the above, counsel for a complainant (who may be, in
fact, a "person aggrieved"), may be faced with the unenviable task
of persuading a judge to engraft upon the statutes the "person ag-
grieved" requirement with regard to standing to sue. If such were
done by the court, sections 15.1-496 and 15.1-497 could survive an
attack which claimed that they represent an unlawful delegation of
police powers. The glib argument which immediately comes to mind
is that the statute should be upheld if possible and the "person
aggrieved" is implied and consistent with the "spirit and purpose"
of the act. While "spirit and purpose" arguments lie well in lofty
intellectual discussions, they offer little comfort to the practitioner
who has been fixed with an icy stare from the bench and ordered to
"Tell me what the statute says-forget this spirit and purpose non-
sense." It is feared that if the statutes are literally interpreted, they
are invalid. Whether the courts are willing to indulge in a bit of
judicial legislation to engraft the requisite standing criteria by im-
plication remains to be seen. 8
66. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See also Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912);
Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1961).
67. Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969); Fairfax County v.
Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9 (1947).
68. An analogy might be drawn to Judge Dalton's opinion in St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F.
Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966), which dealt with the exercise of jurisdiction under Virginia's
"long arm" statute. Judge Dalton reasoned that courts have inherent power to exercise their
jurisdiction to the limits of due process. Any statute which purported to extend the power
beyond those limits would, of course, have no effect. Virginia's statute did not approach the
limits of due process in providing for extra-territorial jurisdiction and did not, by its terms,
state that jurisdiction was confined to the limits of the statute. The court interpreted the act
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Throughout these discussions we are inexorably drawn back to
the "special and distinct harm" required for standing to sue for
public nuisance. The question becomes not so much whether the
legislature has sanctioned the particular cause of action (for the
legislature can go only so far in delegating its police powers), but
whether an interest has been invaded which, apart from any zoning
regulations, the law recognizes and protects. This concept will be
further discussed in the text accompanying notes 75-86 infra, which
deals with the right to file suit to enjoin a violation of the zoning
ordinance in those situations not covered by section 15.1-496.
One further point relative to standing bears brief mention. Since
it has been held that use and building permits issued in violation
of a zoning ordinance are absolutely void, how can any time limita-
tion be placed upon the right of a private citizen to challenge con-
struction of the particular building involved (assuming now that the
direct access provision of section 15.1-496 is valid)? Certainly the
passage of fifteen days does not magically transform a void permit
into a valid one. The simple and, it is believed, correct answer is
that while the permit is still void, a private citizen simply has no
standing to challenge it after the expiration of the fifteen day period.
That right resides solely in the local authorities, who are not ham-
pered by the doctrines of laches and estoppel which plague mortal
men.69 Along these lines, it would appear that the decisions which
hold that a person acquires some vested rights in use and building
permits are predicated upon the assumption that such permits are
validly issued in conformance with the zoning laws. The rights are
vested only as against an attempted change in the ordinance or
regulations after the permits, if valid, have been issued. 0
as sanctioning the exercise of jurisdiction at least to the limits set out therein and providing
objective guidelines with regard to acts which would subject a non-resident to the power of
Virginia courts. The question, therefore, was not so much concerned with the effect of the
codification of jurisdictional acts but with the inherent jurisdictional power of courts, as
limited by due process.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491 (Repl. Vol. 1973). See also Segaloffv. City of Newport News,
209 Va. 259, 163 S.E.2d 135 (1968).
70. Board of Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972); Board
of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972). A prohibition
against impairment of vested rights has always been present in the zoning laws and is pres-
ently found in VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-492 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
It is happily beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the situation which obtains
when a local governing body issues use and building permits, allows the structure to be
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G. When Has Construction Started Within the Meaning
of Section 15.1-496?
Since both use and building permits automatically expire after a
given period of time unless construction has commenced, the zoning
administrator generally must make a determination in this regard.
Such determination will depend upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. It has been held that construction has not begun until
building materials are "united together on the site."'" However, it
would be a mistake to read that decision as an inflexible rule of law,
as the Virginia Supreme Court was obviously governed by the par-
ticular facts and circumstances before it, and made it clear that the
appropriate test was whether th5 builder was proceeding with dili-
gence.7" Merely running a bulldozer over the ground and then re-
maining idle for six months would probably be construed as a ruse,
engaged in for the purpose of attempting to prevent the permits
from expiring. It would seem equally clear that the excavation of an
underground parking garage for a high rise office building should
normally be considered the start of construction, even though the
shell of the building had not been commenced. In general, if it
appears from a view of the site that the original intention to build
has not been abandoned, construction has commenced within the
meaning of local ordinances and section 15.1-496.11 Therefore, if a
citizen desires to avail himself of the direct access provisions of
section 15.1-496, he would be well advised to assume that construc-
tion has commenced as of the day that any activity on the construc-
tion site begins, and govern himself accordingly with regard to the
fifteen-day limitation.
completed and then orders it demolished as a violation of the zoning laws. Suffice it to say
that, although the current state of the law would seem to permit this, there should come a
time when, absent fraud, an individual's rights in this type of situation do, in fact, vest, and
are not subject to attack from any front. This idea has precedents in other areas of Virginia
law. For example, Virginia's Antitrust Act immunizes private conduct which, though the acts
themselves may violate the antitrust laws, was undertaken pursuant to approval by a state
or federal agency. VA. CoDE ANN. § 59.1-9.4(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
71. McClung v. County of Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 108 S.E.2d 513 (1959).
72. The facts of McClung revealed that the only "construction" which had begun prior to
the date of expiration of the building permit involved work for which a building permit was
not required.
73. McClung v. County of Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 877, 108 S.E.2d 513, 518 (1959).
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H. Burden of Proof
If, as previously contended, 74 section 15.1-496 is an exclusive,
mandatory remedy, and its provisions are jurisdictional, the burden
would be on the complainant to allege and prove facts showing
compliance with the requirements of the statute. Failure to allege
such facts would be demurrable, since noncompliance with the stat-
ute would not be a matter of affirmative defensive pleading.
V. AVALABILTY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN SITUATIONS NOT COVERED
BY SECTION 15.1-496
As a final consideration, it must be determined whether a private
citizen may invoke the general equitable remedy of injunction to
enforce a zoning ordinance in situations which are not covered by
section 15.1-496.
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court of Virginia has ren-
dered no decision in this area, either with or without reference to
the statute. Courts in several other states have considered the avail-
ability of injunctive relief to a private citizen desiring to enforce a
zoning ordinance but, from the limited material available, it would
appear that no cases have been decided in the context of a statute,
such as section 15.1-496, in which the legislature has specifically
granted direct access to the courts.7 5
The rationales of the various decisions have been quite varied and
appear on their face to lack consistency. Some states, by statute,
have made a violation of a zoning ordinance a nuisance, while others
have judicially held it so on the theory that, although the erection
of the structure may not in itself constitute a nuisance, it becomes
so when erected in a place or a manner forbidden by law. 71 One court
has even constructed a third party beneficiary theory, stating that
the benefit derived from enforcing zoning laws accrues to abutting
property owners as well as the town.77 Other states have held that a
74. See text accompanying notes 37-55 supra.
75. See O'Brien v. Turner, 255 Mass. 84, 150 N.E. 886 (1926), and Whitridge v. Calestock,
100 Misc. 367, 165 N.Y.S. 640 (1917). Both allude to statutes which provide certain remedies.
Both cases, however, hold that the courts will not restrain violations of zoning ordinances
unless special and "private" harm can be shown.
76. See 3 RATHKOPH, THE LAW OF ZONING & PLANNING at 66-4,5 (3d ed. 1972), and cases
cited therein.
77. Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925). Even this broad holding, however,
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suit in equity may be maintained only for redress of property rights
and that an individual's interest in his neighbor's obedience to stat-
utes or ordinances is not such a property right." Whatever the
stated rationale, in virtually all of the decisions from other jurisdic-
tions, courts have alluded to the public nuisance requirement that
the plaintiff suffer some special and distinct damage, different in
kind and degree from the public at large.79
Regardless of what other states may have done under similar
circumstances, it is doubtful that the Virginia Supreme Court
would hold that, in the absence of statute, a private citizen has any
right to enforce a zoning ordinance by an action for injunction.
Consequently, a private citizen would have no cause of action for
any situation which does not fall within the purview of that stat-
ute. 0
requires that the plaintiff be a person whose property is affected, or a "person aggrieved."
78. Mullholland v. State Racing Comm'n, 295 Mass. 286, 3 N.E.2d 773 (1936); Srager v.
Mintz, 109 N.J.Eq. 544, 158 A. 471 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932). See also YoKLEY, supra note 10,
§ 10-6, at 443 ("Adjacent land owners have no private rights by statute or otherwise to enforce
the zoning laws on the land of a neighbor.").
79. Compare Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., Inc., 106 Conn. 475, 138 A. 483 (1927)
(injunction would lie as plaintiff had shown special and peculiar damages, different from the
public at large) with Lehmaier v. Wadsworth, 122 Conn. 571, 191 A. 539 (1937) (failure to
show special damages precluded plaintiff from filing an action to enjoin violation of a zoning
ordinance). Compare Rice v. Van Vranken, 225 App. Div. 179, 232 N.Y.S. 506 (1924) (showing
of direct financial loss entitled plaintiff to maintain an action for injunction) with Atkins v.
West, 222 App. Div. 308, 226 N.Y.S. 335 (1928) (plaintiff could not maintain an action for
injunction since there had been no showing of any special damage or injury to property). See
generally YoKLEY, supra note 10, § 10-6, at 442-43, asserting that a court of equity has
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against the violation of a zoning ordinance only when a
citizen avers and proves an injury peculiar to himself and not in common with others in the
neighborhood.
80. If § 15.1-496 provides an exclusive and mandatory remedy for those situations which
fall within its purview, a compelling argument can be made that, by providing some remedy,
the legislature meant to exclude all others. Nor is it believed that § 15.1-499 grants carte
blanche to a private citizen to enjoin violations of the zoning ordinance. Quite apart from
the fact that such an interpretation would render the fifteen day limitation in § 15.1-496
meaningless, its predecessor statutes were concerned with granting local officials the power
to institute appropriate proceedings to prevent unlawful construction, alteration or repair of
a building or unlawful use of land or premises. VA. CoDE ANN. § 2880tt & 3091(22) (1942);
Id. §§ 15-840 & 15-851 (1950). In 1962, the statute was amended to delete references to local
authorities and incorporate the present language. Id. § 15-969 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
It might be argued that the deletion of references to local officials indicated an intent to
make the remedy available to all citizens in cases arising under zoning ordinances. However,
it seems more logical that the legislature meant to indicate that in situations where access
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As a prefatory comment, it would be well to remember that the
mere fact that a case provides a proper subject for equitable relief
does not, in and of itself, mean that the entire panoply of equitable
remedies is automatically available to the complainant. For exam-
ple, an injunction will not issue in every case of nuisance or continu-
ing trespass, for the court is bound to consider both the interest of
the parties and the interest of the public. If the harm an injunction
would cause the defendant is out of proportion to the injuries com-
plainant seeks to remedy, the injunction will be denied.81 It is easy
for practitioners to lose sight of this basic fact, particularly as one
becomes convinced that truth and justice are squarely in his corner,
and to forget that his burden is not only to convince the court of his
client's right to redress, but also that the facts of the case warrant
injunctive relief.
An injunction is granted to protect existing rights or liens from
irreparable injury, and does not create any new lien or give rise to a
new substantive right.82 Therefore, in the absence of any statute
giving a private citizen the right to enforce a zoning ordinance, the
burden is on the complainant to show that he has a common law
cause of action for redress of the particular invasion. This, of course,
places us back in the category of common law nuisance.
The closest analogy which can be drawn from the reported Vir-
ginia decisions involves those cases in which a private citizen has
attempted to enforce a local ordinance other than a zoning ordi-
nance. It has been held many times that equity will not restrain an
act merely because it is in violation of a criminal statute or local
ordinance, but where the violation results in special injury to prop-
erty rights, and monetary damages are difficult or impossible to
ascertain, an injunction will issue.8 3 Virginia requires an exception-
to the courts was otherwise granted, such as in § 15.1-496, the remedy of injunction was
available. See McNair v. Clatterbuck, 212 Va. 532, 186 S.E.2d 45 (1972), which involved an
action filed by the zoning administrator to enforce the ordinance. The court held that § 15.1-
499 supplemented § 15.1-491 and gave the trial court jurisdiction to grant an injunction even
though the local ordinance did not expressly provide for its enforcement by injunction.
81. Seventeen, Inc. v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 Va. 74, 205 S.E.2d 648 (1974); Akers v.
Mathieson Alkali Works, 151 Va. 1, 144 S.E. 492 (1928).
82. Deeds v. Gilmer, 162 Va. 157, 174 S.E. 37 (1934).
83. Woodfin v. Overnight Transp. Co., 199 Va. 165, 98 S.E.2d 525 (1957); Mears v. Town
of Colonial Beach, 166 Va. 278, 184 S.E. 175 (1936); Turner v. Hicks, 164 Va. 612, 180 S.E.
543 (1935); Long's Baggage Transfer Co. v. Burford, 144 Va. 339, 132 S.E. 355 (1926); Landon
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ally strong showing of standing in such cases. For example, it has
been held that even though the location or operation of a particular
activity may adversely affect the property of others, such is not per
se a ground for complaint. 4 In another case, 5 the defendant, whose
property adjoined that of the complainant, constructed a building
of materials which violated the town fire ordinance, and complain-
ant sought to have the construction enjoined. He proved to the
satisfaction of the court that the illegal construction both increased
the risk of fire to his premises and caused his insurance premiums
to be raised. After stating the general rule that equity will not re-
strain violation of a local ordinance unless special and irreparable
injury to private property is shown, the court held that the facts of
the case would not support injunctive relief. The complainant de-
pended entirely upon the ordinance for his standing, since the act
complained of was not a nuisance and not unlawful in the absence
of the ordinance, and a private citizen cannot call upon a court of
equity to exercise discretion which properly rests with the town
council."
It is submitted that Virginia's approach in this general area is
much sounder than that of certain other states, which seem ob-
sessed with the idea that a private citizen must have the right to
enforce a zoning ordinance. As a result, we are witness to frantic
efforts to fit square pegs into round holes as courts attempt to con-
vince themselves that somehow the common law has always con-
templated that, if and when zoning laws were enacted, private citi-
zens would have the right to enforce them by injunction. At times,
"nuisance" is treated as if it were a four letter word, as the courts
struggle with situations arising under the zoning laws which do not
always fit neatly into the traditional definition of a nuisance. Yet
the criteria established under the zoning decisions invariably in-
v. Kwass, 123 Va. 544, 96 S.E. 764 (1918). It is particularly interesting to note that in Mears
it was the town which was denied the right to enjoin defendant from constructing a pier and
operating a beer garden in violation of the town ordinance.
84. Daniel v. Kosh, 173 Va. 352, 4 S.E.2d 381 (1939).
85. Landon v. Kwass, 123 Va. 544, 96 S.E. 764 (1918).
86. For other decisions holding that equity will not, at the behest of a private citizen,
interfere by injunction with the exercise of discretionary powers with which local officials are
clothed, see Shield v. Peninsula Land Co., 147 Va. 736, 133 S.E. 586 (1926); Ferguson v. Board
of Supervisors, 133 Va. 561, 113 S.E. 860 (1922).
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volve special and distinct harm. This approach is reminiscent of the
problems inherent in the inflexibility of the ancient English law
writs which fostered the development of equity.
The proper inquiry is not whether, in the absence of statute, a
private citizen may sue to enjoin violations of a zoning regulation.
Stated in those terms, of course he cannot, and decisions which
attempt to manufacture such a right are fraught with the danger of
establishing poor precedents. Standing to sue should in no way be
predicated upon the violation of an ordinance. Rather, the inquiry
should be directed towards whether the act complained of invades
a protected right of the complainant for which equity will afford
relief, regardless of whether the act violates one or more ordinances.
The special and distinct harm standing criteria, coupled with the
long established principles relating to the issuance of injunctions,
seem to provide a good foundation for the protection of the ag-
grieved citizen.
VI. SUGGESTED CHANGES
One of the best established maxims of our profession is that a
lawyer should never ask a question to which he does not know the
answer. This article has flagrantly violated that sage precept, as we
still lack judicial guidelines in this specific area upon which to base
our conclusions. It was not the purpose of the article to nit pick at
the statutes and, in so doing, administer something of a verbal wrist
tap to the General Assembly, but rather to suggest that there are
some areas where changes made now may avoid a great deal of
confusion in the courts later. It is therefore respectfully suggested
that the following would be beneficial:
(1) Repeal section 15.1-499. It was originally intended to provide
enforcement powers to local officials which are now adequately cov-
ered in section 15.1-491. If it is believed necessary, the remedy of
injunction could be specifically set out in the direct access provision
of section 15.1-496. However, the continued existence of section
15.1-499 engenders a great deal of confusion as regards its intended
effect and application.
(2) Delete "any taxpayer" from section 15.1-497.
(3) Place the direct access provisions of section 15.1-496 in a
separate section (perhaps section 15.1-496.1) and provide;
[Vol. 9:483
1975] ZONING LAWS 511
(a) that in order to bring an action, an individual must be
a "person aggrieved," or words of like effect;
(b) that actual notice of the issuance of the building per-
mit refers to notice at the time of issuance;
(c) that the statute provides an exclusive remedy and is
mandatory and jurisdictional.
Regardless of how carefully any piece of legislation is drawn, there
will always be questions concerning its construction, interpretation
and effect. Were the situation otherwise, we could drape judicial
robes on a computer and lawyers would be out of business. It is
believed, however, that the changes suggested would be helpful in
clarifying rights and limitations in the area of private enforcement
of zoning laws, and would provide ample protection and redress for
all "persons aggrieved."
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